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WHO BEARS THE COST OF AN 
EMERGENCY: BALANCE BILLING’S 
EFFECTS ON HEALTH CARE 
PROVIDERS, AND SOLUTIONS 





In the United States, insured patients have the 
freedom to select non-emergency medical care from out-of-
network providers, allowing patients to receive this care 
from the physicians they want so long as they are willing to 
pay out-of-network costs.1  When it is do or die and insured 
patients are in need of emergency medical care but are not in 
the position to receive care in-network, there is legislation in 
place to protect patients from excess charges for out-of-
network emergency care.2  Though beneficial to the 
 
1 California Law Protects Consumers from Surprise Medical Bills, Sometimes 
Also Referred to as Balance Billing, DEP’T OF MANAGED HEALTHCARE (June 
2017), 
https://dmhc.ca.gov/Portals/0/HealthCareInCalifornia/FactSheets/fsab72.pdf. 
2 See generally Elizabeth Davis, How to Pay In-Network Rates for Out-Of-
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consumer, it is the health providers who receive unfair 
reimbursement from the patient’s insurance carrier.3 
For individual health insurance organizations, the 
insurance company enters into contracts with doctors and 
hospitals to provide services at agreed upon rates, those 
contracted providers are what is considered “in-network.”4  
However, for medical services provided to patients from 
doctors who are not within that patient’s specific healthcare 
plan, called out-of-network, those providers are not 
subjected to any contracted rates.5  As a result, the final bill 
for services provided must be balanced in a way to ensure 
the health providers receive fair compensation for their 
services.6  This process is known as balance billing.7 
Balance billing, which is also sometimes known as 
surprise billing, occurs when insured patients receive 
emergency care from providers that are out-of-network for 
their healthcare plans.8  Patients with healthcare insurance 
plans often wrongfully assume that their plans will fully 
cover the costs of emergency procedures;9  however, the 
health provider will charge patients for the excess cost of 
care that the insurance plan did not reimburse, hence the 
remaining bill comes as a “surprise” to the patient.10   
 
3 See Glenn Melnick et al., Regulating Out-Of-Network Hospital Emergency 
Prices: Problem and Potential Benchmarks, HEALTHAFFAIRS.ORG, (March 23, 
2020), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20200320.866552/full/. 
4 Steven Allison et al., Searching For A Solution To Surprise Medical 
Billing In California, LAW360 (Aug. 26, 2019) 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1192125. 
5 Allison, supra note 4.  
6 Allison, supra note 4. 
7 Davis, supra note 2.  
8 Allison, supra note 4. 
9 Joshua Cohen, Surprise Billing: Another Healthcare Market Failure, FORBES 
(June 10, 2019), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/joshuacohen/2019/06/10/surprise-billing-
another-healthcare-market-failure/#11921919399e. 
10 Cohen, supra note 9. 
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The United States spends the highest amount on 
healthcare per person of any wealthy, developed country.11  
As a way to combat the already high cost of care and to 
protect patients, many states have passed legislation that 
restricts doctors and hospitals from billing patients for the 
amount of emergency care that is not covered by that 
patient’s insurance carrier.12  Although beneficial to patients, 
this legislation has a widely negative impact on hospitals and 
health care providers.13   
The California Assembly Bill 72 (A.B. 72) protects 
patients who have used in-network hospitals or services, but 
have received certain aspects of the care out-of-network, like 
lab tests or specialist providers, which the patient has no 
control over.14  In these circumstances the patient does 
“everything right,” but still receives a surprise bill for the 
aspects of care that are not covered by their insurance plan.15  
California is one of twenty-two states to enact a law or some 
form of regulation that provides consumer protections 
against surprise billing, all of which restrict insurance 
carriers from holding patients accountable for the excess 
medical bills that the carriers will not cover.16  California is 
 
11 How Does the U.S. Healthcare System Compare to Other Countries, PETER 
G. PETERSON FOUNDATION BLOG (July 22, 2019), 
https://www.pgpf.org/blog/2019/07/how-does-the-us-healthcare-system-
compare-to-other-countries?.  
12 Sarah Kliff & Margot Sanger-Katz, In California, a ‘Surprise’ Billing Law is 
Protecting Patients and Angering Doctors, THE UPSHOT (Sept. 6, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/26/upshot/california-surprise-medical-
billing-law-effects.html. 
13 Kliff & Sanger-Katz, supra note 12.  
14 California Law Protects Consumers from Surprise Medical Bills, Sometimes 
Also Referred to as Balance Billing, supra note 1, at 1–2. 
15 California Law Protects Consumers from Surprise Medical Bills, Sometimes 
Also Referred to as Balance Billing, supra note 1, at 1–2. 
16 Korey Clark, How States Are Attending to Medical Balance Billing, LAW360 
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also among some states that protect consumers from surprise 
billing in both emergency and non-emergency settings.17   
Currently, the main solutions to these disputes 
include either establishing a method for calculating 
reimbursement or providing settlement through arbitration.18  
Arbitration, as well as other forms of alternative dispute 
resolution, provide many benefits for all parties when a 
dispute arises, such as faster results and less expense and 
time than litigation, and the potential for more qualified 
finders of fact on a specific topic rather than a jury of peers.19  
In the following case note, Part II will focus on the 
background of different types of health insurance carriers in 
the United States, the Knox-Keene Act, and the California 
Assembly Bill 1611.20  Part III will discuss more specifically 
the issues that stem from balance billing through explicit 
cases.21  Part IV will explore current and proposed solutions 
to balance billing issues, comparing current legislation that 
includes arbitration to those offered in the federal arena.22  
Finally, this note will conclude by reviewing the problem 
and acknowledging proposed solutions’ probabilities of 
being enacted and their impact on balance billing disputes.23  
 
II. HEALTH CARE IN THE UNITED STATES 
The United States has notoriously complicated 
health insurance systems: the regulations, the outrageous 
costs of care per capita with little positive return, and the 
limited access to care in comparison with other 
 
17 Clark, supra note 16. 
18 Michael Levinson, Why Eliminating Surprise Medical Bills Is A Challenge, 
LAW360 (July 22, 2019) https://www.law360.com/articles/1179513/why-
eliminating-surprise-medical-bills-is-a-challenge. 
19 JUDGE H. WARREN KNIGHT (RET.) ET AL., Advantages vs. Disadvantages of 
Contractual Arbitration, in CAL. PRAC. GUIDE ALT. DISP. RES. 5:2 (2020).  
20 See infra pp. 4-9. 
21 See infra pp. 10-18. 
22 See infra pp. 18-28. 
23 See infra pp. 28-30. 
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Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) countries.24  Understanding the United States 
health insurance systems will clarify why and how the issue 
of surprise billing persists.  
The United States is infamous for its exorbitant 
medical care costs.25  Americans are covered by public and 
private health insurance carriers; public care is health care 
provided by the government such as Medicare, Medicaid, 
and Children’s Health Insurance Program, while private care 
includes either employer-sponsored insurance or individual-
bought health insurance.26  The various types of private care 
are: Exclusive Provider Organization (EPO), Health 
Maintenance Organization (HMO), Point of Service (POS), 
and Preferred Provider Organization (PPO).27  Given the 
numerous types of care, both private and public, this section 
will focus primarily on HMOs.  
HMOs are a type of insurance network that limits 
patients to receive care only from doctors who either work 
for or are contracted with the HMO; those doctors are 
considered in-network.28  The Health Management 
 
24 U.S. Health Care Spending Highest Among Developed Countries, JOHNS 
HOPKINS BLOOMBERG SCH. OF PUBLIC HEALTH (Jan. 7, 2019), 
https://www.jhsph.edu/news/news-releases/2019/us-health-care-spending-
highest-among-developed-countries.html.  
25 Anthony Chan, Differences Between Private and Public Insurance in the 
United States (Jan. 15, 2019) https://www.pacificprime.com/blog/differences-
between-private-and-public-insurance-in-the-united-states.html; see How Does 
the U.S. Healthcare System Compare to Other Countries, supra note 8 
(explaining that “[i]n 2018, the U.S. spent about $10,600 per person on 
healthcare — the highest healthcare costs per capita across the OECD.  For 
comparison, Switzerland was the second highest-spending country with about 
$7,300 in healthcare costs per capita, while the average for wealthy OECD 
countries, excluding the United States, was only $5,300 per person.”). 
26 Chan, supra note 25. 
27 Health Insurance Plan and Network Types: HMOs, PPOs, and More, 
HEALTHCARE.GOV (last visited Feb. 10, 2020), 
https://www.healthcare.gov/choose-a-plan/plan-types/. 
28 Health Insurance Plan and Network Types: HMOs, PPOs, and More, supra 
note 24.  
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Organization Act of 1973 allowed for greater expansion of 
managed health care;29  it requires the Federal Government 
to give financial support to developing HMOs for a limited 
trial-period.30  The legislation’s purpose was to increase 
competition within healthcare markets as a way to create 
outpatient alternatives to expensive hospital-based 
treatment.31   
Though most Americans are covered by private 
insurance carriers, “patient dumping” by hospitals became a 
problem that received increased attention in the early 
1980s.32  During this time, people would be turned away 
from hospitals and unable to receive care due to their type of 
insurance or lack thereof.33  Many hospitals preferred to turn 
away people in need rather than risk any economic loss for a 
patient that could not afford the cost of whatever care they 
needed.34  In response to this problem, Congress passed the 
Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act 
(EMTALA) in 1986.35  With EMTALA, hospitals could no 
longer turn away patients or stall care in order to determine 
if a patient could afford treatment.36  EMTALA is “a 
 
29 A Brief History of Managed Care, NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, 
https://www.ncd.gov/policy/appendix-b-brief-history-managed-care (last 
visited Feb. 10, 2020). 
30 Marjorie Smith Mueller, Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, SOC. 
SEC. BULL., NOTES AND BRIEF REPS. 35 (March 1974), 
https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v37n3/v37n3p35.pdf.  
31 A Brief History of Managed Care, supra note 29. 
32 Beverly Cohen, Disentangling EMTALA from Medical Malpractice: Revising 
EMTALA's Screening Standard to Differentiate Between Ordinary Negligence 
and Discriminatory Denials of Care, 82 TUL. L. REV. 645, 650 (2007). 
33 Thomas A. Gionis, The Intentional Tort of Patient Dumping: A New State 
Cause of Action to Address the Shortcomings of the Federal Emergency 
Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), 52 AM. U. L. REV. 173, 
175 (2002). 
34 Gionis, supra note 33, at 186. 
35 Cohen, supra note 32, at 656. 
36 Robert Bitterman, EMTALA: The Law That Forever Changed the Practice of 
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reflection of a public belief that in the wealthiest nation in 
the world, people should not be turned away from, or thrown 
out of, hospitals to die on the streets.”37   
 
A. THE KNOX-KEENE ACT 
Although the individuals that receive care through 
an HMO do have insurance, issues arise regarding out-of-
network care.38  In emergency situations, a patient may be 
closer to an out-of-network hospital and may not want to risk 
traveling further away to an in-network facility to receive 
care.39  EMTALA made it possible for all patients to receive 
emergency care at any hospital regardless of insurance 
plan.40  However, patients were then being charged 
exorbitant amounts for emergency care at non-contracted 
facilities.41  The California Knox-Keene Health Care Service 
Plan Act of 1975 (Knox-Keene Act) presented a solution.42  
The Act requires HMOs to cover the costs of their 
consumers’ out-of-network emergency services.43  Despite 
this protection, the Act still left many individuals uncovered 
either because the services rendered were considered non-
emergency medical services, or because the patient was not 
a member of an HMO insurance plan.44   
After the creation of the Knox-Keene Act, insurance 
carriers and health care providers began disagreeing about 
how to balance patients’ bills for out-of-network emergency 
 
37  Cohen, supra note 32, at 655. 
38 Steven Allison, Searching For A Solution To Surprise Medical Billing In 
California, LAW360 (Aug. 26, 2019), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1192125. 
39 Gionis, supra note 33, at 186. 
40 Bitterman, supra note 36.  
41 George A. Nation III, Saving Surprise Medical Billing Legislation, THE HILL 
(Sept. 16, 2019), https://thehill.com/opinion/healthcare/461163-saving-
surprise-medical-billing-legislation. 
42 Laws & Regulations, DEP’T OF MANAGED HEALTH CARE, 
https://www.dmhc.ca.gov/AbouttheDMHC/LawsRegulations.aspx#knoxkeene 
(last visited Feb. 10, 2020). 
43 Allison, supra note 4. 
44 Allison, supra note 4.  
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services because the Act restricted emergency room doctors 
from billing a patient for any amount of service left unpaid 
by the HMO.45  Any dispute about payment could only be 
handled between the emergency room doctors and the HMO; 
a patient could not be injected into the dispute whatsoever, 
which typically left the physician with an unsubsidized 
bill.46   
In twenty-one states, patients are not responsible for 
any amount of the bill left unpaid by the insurance company 
for emergency medical procedures.47  This includes 
situations where a patient unknowingly received care from 
an out-of-network provider within an in-network facility, 
“such as a non-network anesthesiologist or radiologist 
contracted by the emergency department of an in-network 
hospital.”48 
 
B. CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY BILL 1611 
  The California Assembly Bill 1611 (A.B. 1611) was 
recently introduced on February 22, 2019.49  A.B. 1611 is 
currently inactive, but if enacted would have prohibited 
hospitals from charging any patient, not just those enrolled 
in HMOs, more than the “in-network cost-sharing” prices for 
emergency services and post stabilization care.50  A.B. 1611 
would require all health plans to either renew or amend 
policies after January 1, 2020 to ensure enrollees receive 
coverage for emergency services from out-of-network 
hospitals and doctors, and would prohibit hospitals from 
billing patients anything beyond their insurance deductibles 
and copayments.51  Non-contracting hospitals and providers 
would be paid for emergency care through a specified 
 
45 Allison, supra note 4. 
46 Allison, supra note 4. 
47 Clark, supra note 16. 
48 Clark, supra note 16. 
49 Assemb. B. 1611, 2019–20 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019). 
50 Allison, supra note 4. 
51 Allison, supra note 4. 
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formula, and non-contracting hospitals would be required to 
bill and collect through a stipulated method.52   
A.B. 1611 would also provide a dispute resolution 
procedure in the event that either party is dissatisfied with 
the payment.53  A.B. 1611 § 5(b)(1) provides “[a] 
noncontracting health facility providing emergency services 
. . . may use the independent dispute resolution procedure 
established under Section 1371.30.  If the noncontracting 
health facility participates in the dispute resolution process, 
the health care service plan shall also participate,” and that 
decision will be binding upon the emergency service 
providers and the insurance carriers.54  Although A.B. 1611 
§ 5(b) applies to the health facilities that provide emergency 
services, it does not apply to the actual physicians, nurses, or 
other health providers who may be burdened by unfair 
compensation by insurance plans.55  
While the California Assembly initially passed A.B. 
1611, the Bill faced debate and opposition in the Senate.56  It 
is likely the Bill would have gone through further editions 
before it was passed and enrolled;57  however, even if A.B. 
1611 had passed, balance billing issues will persist.58  There 
will still be gaps in the protection of insureds, as well as in 
the protection of individual physicians and health providers.   
 
III. THE REAL EFFECTS OF BALANCE BILLING 
DISPUTES   
Common problems that lead to, and extend from, 
balance billing disputes can be understood through various 
cases.  These issues range in complexity as well as subject 
matter and offer insight as to how intricate and pervasive 
 
52 Allison, supra note 4. 
53 Allison, supra note 4. 
54 Assemb. B. 1611, 2019–20 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019). 
55 Assemb. B. 1611, 2019–20 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019). 
56 Allison, supra note 4,  
57 Allison, supra note 4. 
58 Assemb. B. 1611, 2019–20 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019). 
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surprise billing is in the American healthcare system.  As 
provided by the following cases, it becomes clear that 
balance billing disputes do not just affect cost shifting 
between patients, providers, and insurance carriers; their 
subsequent litigation creates further problems than simply 
settling the medical bill.   
 
A. CUTS IN PROVIDER REIMBURSEMENTS   
As previously noted, out-of-network providers have 
little-to-no restrictions on what they can charge patients, and 
as a result, physicians will charge more for services provided 
to out-of-network patients in an attempt to subsidize for the 
lower rates of reimbursement they receive from insurance 
carriers.59  Out-of-network physicians are called on by the 
hospital to provide treatment for a patient and therefore do 
not have contracts with patients directly.60  Doctors instead 
receive reimbursement for their medical procedures by way 
of a quasi-contract but are only entitled to the “reasonable” 
value of their services, which is generally less than the actual 
cost for care. 61   
Emergency doctors are fearful that they carry a 
financial risk from cuts in reimbursements for services and 
will not receive fair compensation from the patient’s 
insurance providers.62  The following case will provide 
insight on how outrageous the difference in reimbursement 
can be and gives example to why physicians set higher rates 
for care than the services actually cost as a way to prevent 
economic loss.   
 
59 Nation III, supra note 41. 
60 Frank Griffin, Fighting Overcharged Bills From Predatory Hospitals, 51 
ARIZ. STATE L.J. 1003, 1014–25 (2019); Levinson, supra note 18. 
61 Ass'n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. Brown, No. 2:16-CV-02441-MCE-
EFB, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53767, at 3–12, 22–24, 27–28 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 
2018); Griffin, supra note 47, at 1015–16. 
62 Levinson, supra note 18. 
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i. NEW YORK CITY HEALTH AND 
HOSPITALS CORPORATION V. 
WELLCARE OF NEW YORK, INC.   
The discrepancy in payment that a health provider 
or facility may receive from an insurance carrier can be 
outrageous.63  
In New York City Health & Hospitals Corp. v. 
WellCare of New York, Inc., the Health and Hospitals 
Corporation (HHC), established by the New York City 
Health and Hospitals Corporation Act, provided the general 
public with medical services and facilities.64  WellCare, a 
private health plan, participated within the Medicare 
Advantage program, providing enrollees with the same 
benefits that would be covered under the original 
Medicare.65  HHC was a non-contracted provider facility 
that provided emergency services for WellCare enrollees 
when needed.66  HHC hospitals would then bill WellCare for 
those services directly using a standard billing form, which 
included related revenue codes and Posted Charges.67  
WellCare would pay HHC the lower of the two amounts 
between the Posted Charges and the Original Medicare 
charge, which in most instances was the posted charges 
 
63 Griffin, supra note 60, at 1004-06 (showing excessive medical bills of 
$46,000.00 for one rabies shot). 
64 N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp. v. WellCare of N.Y., Inc., 801 F. Supp. 2d 
126, 131 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing New York City Health and Hospitals 
Corporation Act, N.Y. PUBLIC HEALTH, ch. 214-A, §§ 2, 5(1–7) (LexisNexis 
2020)). 
65 N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 801 F. Supp. 2d at 132.  Through the 
Medicare Advantage program, consumers obtain the same benefits through 
private Managed Health Care Organizations (MA organizations) like WellCare.  
Id. at 131.  MA organizations then enter into contracts with the Center for 
Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), where they pay each MA organization 
a set amount for each Medicare beneficiary that the MA organization enrolls, 
and in return, MA organizations agree to provide those enrolls with the same 
benefits they would be entitled to under the Original Medicare program.  Id. 
66 N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 801 F. Supp. 2d at 132.  
67 N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 801 F. Supp. 2d at 132.  
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amount.68  In 2008, HHC demanded that WellCare pay the 
original Medicare costs, and pay the difference on all 
previous claims that WellCare had previously underpaid.69  
The amount in dispute was over $2.8 million.70   
Though the Court acknowledged that the CMS 
offered a dispute resolution program that allowed for non-
contracted providers to resolve any payment dispute with 
MA organizations, it was unclear if that program was in 
place at the time this dispute arose.71  Absent the clear 
establishment of a dispute resolution program, WellCare 
sought to dismiss HHC’s claim for failure to state a claim.72  
HHC, however, “argu[ed] that its lack of alternative 
remedies suggest[ed] that its suit [was] appropriate.”73  
Despite the procedural uncertainty, the case was ultimately 
dismissed due to an absence of evidence that Congress had 
intended to confer non-contracted providers and facilities 
with third-party beneficiary rights of Original Medicare.74  
The uncertainty over whether the appropriate 
procedure was to go forth with a lawsuit or use an alternative 
dispute remedy creates further problems, ultimately causing 
both parties to spend more time and money just to establish 
that bringing a suit was correct.  In the end, because HHC 
was provided no way to recover any of the $2.8 million they 
claim was underpaid by WellCare, the healthcare facility 
was left to bear the burden of loss in reimbursement for 
providing emergency services to patients in need.  The 
amount of risk in reimbursement that health providers and 
facilities undertake when providing emergency services for 
 
68 N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 801 F. Supp. 2d at 132.  Posted Charges were 
typically less than what HHC would receive as payment under Original 
Medicare.  N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 801 F. Supp. 2d at 132.   
69 N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 801 F. Supp. 2d at 133.  
70 N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 801 F. Supp. 2d at 133.  
71 N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 801 F. Supp. 2d at 139. 
72 N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 801 F. Supp. 2d at 133. 
73 N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 801 F. Supp. 2d  at 139.  
74 N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 801 F. Supp. 2d at 140. 
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members while being out-of-network only adds to surprise 
billing issues and the U.S.’s enormous health care spending 
by compelling providers to raise their cost of care to 
subsidize their losses.75  
 
A. EXCESSIVE CHARGES ON PART OF THE 
PROVIDER 
In order to combat the loss in payment as discussed 
in the previous case, physicians and healthcare facilities will 
overcharge patients and their subsequent insurance carriers 
for services.  
ii. UNITED HEALTH SERVICES V. 
PARACHA 
In Unitedhealthcare Services v. Paracha, 
Unitedhealthcare Services (“United”) brought action against 
Dr. Paracha seeking to enjoin Paracha from engaging in 
egregious billing practices.76  United argued that the patient, 
though insured, either never agreed to excessive charges by 
Paracha or was not advised by Paracha of those charges.77  
However, at the time Paracha provided the emergency 
medical care, the patient was incapacitated and unable to 
consider whether any doctor was within his healthcare 
network plan.78  Essentially, United claimed that Paracha 
“routinely conspired to inflate the rates they charged for 
medical services in order to maximize the amount actually 
received as reimbursement from United,” showing that the 
charges were excessive compared to Fair Health Standards.79  
Although shown to be “excessive,” the Court held that 
 
75 Nation III, supra note 59. 
76 Unitedhealthcare Servs. v. Paracha, 070033/2014, 2015 NYLJ LEXIS 1974, 
2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. September 14, 2015) (hereinafter “Paracha”). 
77 Paracha, 2015 NYLJ LEXIS 1974 at 6. 
78 Paracha, 2015 NYLJ LEXIS 1974 at 4. 
79 Paracha, 2015 NYLJ LEXIS 1974 at 5, 7. 
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Paracha was not bound to set rates for services rendered 
based on the Fair Health Standards.80 
New York enacted the “Surprise Bills Law,” which 
came into effect in March of 2015—after the Paracha 
patient was billed and the dispute arose.81  The new law set 
forth guidelines for the patient, the physician, and the 
insurance carrier to follow when an out-of-network doctor 
renders emergency care.82  Unfortunately, the law did not 
address retroactive adjustment of fees and was therefore 
unusable.83   
In the absence of a contractually or statutorily 
mandated fee-cap, physicians are at liberty to set their own 
fees, and do so as a way to compensate for the systemic loss 
in compensation they have received for years.84  This tug-of-
war between physicians and insurers creates unnecessary 
disputes, and the lack of guidelines and legislation induces—
as well as prolongs—balance billing disputes.   
B. COMPLICATIONS IN DEFINING 
EMERGENCY SERVICES 
The issue of defining what constitutes “emergency 
services” presents itself as it pertains to determining how to 
reimburse for those services—including what types of 
facilities and health providers are included within balance 
billing regulations.  
iii. YDM MANAGEMENT CO., INC., 
V. SHARP COMMUNITY 
MEDICAL GROUP  
Sharp Urgent Center—an Independent Practice 
Association (“IPA”)—provided enrollees with an HMO 
plan, but allowed their patients to seek services at 
 
80 Paracha, 2015 NYLJ LEXIS 1974 at 7.  
81 Paracha, 2015 NYLJ LEXIS 1974 at 5. 
82 Paracha, 2015 NYLJ LEXIS 1974 at 6. 
83 Paracha, 2015 NYLJ LEXIS 1974 at 6. 
84 Paracha, 2015 NYLJ LEXIS 1974 at 6 (quoting Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 
286, 291 (1999)).   
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physicians’ individual practices.85  Sharp claimed that 
requests for reimbursement submitted by the out-of-network 
provider—Doctors Express—failed to include the Current 
Procedural Technology Codes (CPT codes) that would have 
informed Sharp of whether those services were for 
emergency medical care.86  Sharp claimed that without those 
CPT codes, there was no way to prove that the services 
provided to Sharp members by Doctors Express were truly 
“emergency” medical services.87   
 Although it was an undisputed fact that Doctors 
Express provided emergency medical services to Sharp 
members, there was uncertainty as to whether an Urgent 
Care center could ever be entitled to reimbursement from 
insurance carriers because these centers are not licensed 
hospital based emergency departments.88  The court 
maintained that there was no need to “determine whether the 
only providers who may be reimbursed for ‘emergency 
services’ are those who provided services within a licensed 
emergency department in a licensed health facility,” and 
instead held the bigger issue was whether the services 
provided were in fact for “emergency services and care.” 89 
The number of issues surrounding balance billing 
disputes that can be brought before a court are infinite, and 
 
85 YDM Mgmt. Co. v. Sharp Cmty. Med. Grp., Inc., 16 Cal. App. 5th 613, 616 
(Ct. App. 2017).  YDM Management Company Inc. purchased accounts 
receivable from urgent care center Doctors Express, for services rendered to 
Sharp managed care members.  Id.  
86 YDM Mgmt. Co., 16 Cal. App. 5th at 617. 
87 YDM Mgmt. Co., 16 Cal. App. 5th at 617. 
88 YDM Mgmt. Co., 16 Cal. App. 5th at 618, 621.  Just as Sharp was required 
to reimburse non-contracted providers for emergency services, Sharp was 
required to reimburse YDM for those emergency services at “the usual 
customary and reasonable rates.”  YDM Mgmt. Co., 16 Cal. App. 5th at 618, 
621.  YDM also alleged that Sharp reimbursed Doctors Express at a rate lower 
than what was customary and reasonable.  YDM Mgmt. Co., 16 Cal. App. 5th 
at 618, 621. 
89 YDM Mgmt. Co., 16 Cal. App. 5th at 627. 
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the need to define emergency care only adds to the copious 
amount of litigation already in the American court system.  
 
C.  COMPLEXITIES DUE TO MULTIPLE 
PARTIES WITH MULTIPLE CLAIMS  
Balance billing disputes with multiple plaintiffs 
and/or defendants with multiple claims can further 
complicate an issue when a court must decide when to 
compel arbitration between the parties.  
 
iv.  IN RE MANAGED CARE 
LITIGATION 
Whether courts compel arbitration depends on 
whether the health care providers are non-par (non-
participating providers that have not entered into contract 
with the insurance carrier)90 or are simply out-of-network.91  
In In Re Managed Care Litigation, a group of doctors sued 
various HMOs on multiple grounds, including breach of 
contract and unjust enrichment.92  The multiple HMO 
defendants sought to compel the plaintiff health care 
providers to arbitrate all of their claims.93  This dispute was 
complicated due to the nature of the various contracts 
between doctors and the HMOs: Some parties did not have 
contracts while others did, and of those with contracts, some 
held arbitration clauses while others placed limitations of the 
types of damages that the arbitrator could award.94   
Despite the trial court’s holding that the claims 
could be resolved through litigation and this decision being 
affirmed in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
 
90 Joy Hicks, Differences Between Par and Non-Par Medical Providers, 
VERYWELL HEALTH (Jan. 9, 2020), https://www.verywellhealth.com/par-vs-
non-par-providers-2317177. 
91 In re Managed Care Litig., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23035, at 10, 32–33 (S.D. 
Fla. Sep. 15, 2003). 
92 In re Managed Care Litig., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23035 at 14. 
93 In re Managed Care Litig., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23035 at 10. 
94 In re Managed Care Litig., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23035 at 14. 
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Circuit, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the health 
providers could be compelled to arbitrate their claims under 
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act 
(RICO), even though certain agreements could be seen as 
limits on the arbitrator’s authority to award damages.95  
Legislation enforcing ADR solutions for balance billing 
disputes would eliminate the need for litigation to determine 
when arbitration can be compelled.  
Arbitration would provide a clear process for all 
aspects of billing disputes, whether the doctor is 
participating or if those that are contracted with an HMO 
have arbitration clauses or not.  Claims that do not fall under 
a provider-insurance contract or have an arbitration clause 
place a continued burden on all parties and the court rather 
than being resolved through arbitration.96  Through these 
cases, it is clear that the issue of balance billing expands far 
beyond the detriments and debt it causes to patient 
consumers or unfair compensation for physicians.  With the 
introduction of mandated ADR based solutions, more 
specifically arbitration, claims and issues surrounding 
balance billing could be greatly diminished.  
 
IV. ADR AND BALANCE BILLING: IS 
ARBITRATION THE ANSWER? 
An issue as complex as surprise billing in the United 
States is not easy to disentangle, however, various states 
have enacted legislature aimed at eliminating balance billing 
 
95 In re Managed Care Litig., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23035 at 11, 49.  The 
Supreme Court held that all arbitrated claims would be stayed pending 
adjudication in arbitration or dismissal by providers, but that not all claims that 
were subject to arbitration would remain active before the Court.  In re 
Managed Care Litig., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23035 at 11, 49. 
96 Richard C. Reuben, Penn State Law Review Symposium: Building the 
Civilizatino of Arbitration: Personal Autonomy and Vacatur After Hall Street, 
113 PENN ST. L. REV. K 1103, 1129-30 (2009).  Arbitration is faster and less 
costly for the parties than the judicial process, and arbitration frees up the 
court’s docket.  Reuben, supra note 96, at 1129–30. 
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entirely.97  Although it is a step in the right direction, current 
legislation still leaves gaps in coverage and protection. 
Balance billing has received ample attention from 
United States legislators aiming to find a solution, and “there 
is strong bipartisan momentum behind the absurd practice of 
surprise medical bills.”98  Officials in multiple states and 
even Congress have proposed legislation that involves 
arbitration as a solution to prevent surprise medical billing.99  
This section will seek to analyze the validity of the several 
proposed solutions and legislation, as well as the likelihood 
that these solutions will be enacted. 
 
A. TRANSPARENT MEDICAL PRICING 
One proposed solution for reducing balance billing 
disputes is to require the price of medical care to be 
transparent.100  While medical care providers develop 
contracts with insurance carriers for the price of care and 
provide the insured with information about the pricing for 
such care, out-of-network providers have no written 
contracts with the patient payor, nor do they have restrictions 
on how much they can charge for their services.101   
The cost of medical procedures are confidential and 
privately negotiated between the hospital and insurance 
company, and the American Hospital Association (AHA) 
would like it to remain that way.102  The AHA opposes 
making those negotiated prices public, fearing that this will 
 
97 Clark, supra note 16. 
98 Mary Ellen McIntire, Bipartisan Group of Senators Offers Plan to Curb 
Surprise Medical Bills, 2019 WL 2135176 (May 16, 2019).  
99 Levinson, supra note 18. 
100 Cohen, supra note 9. 
101 Levinson, supra note 18. 
102 Emily Felder, HHS Rule Could Disrupt How Hospitals and Insurers Set 
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cut market competition.103  The AHA argues that consumers 
want more expansive information on the amount of out-of-
pocket costs, rather than the explicit price itself.104  Though 
transparency in costs for out-of-network procedures would 
appear to provide a clear cut solution by reducing balance 
billing disputes,105 methods of alternative dispute resolution 
could instead be a viable option for reducing costs while 
keeping the major players involved happy. 
 
B. STATE AND FEDERAL LEGISLATION, 
CURRENT AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
The issue of balanced billing has permeated 
throughout the country, with many states attempting to solve 
the problem through proposed legislation.106  In 2019, thirty-
two states considered legislation to solve balance billing 
problems, with only seven bills enacted out of the total 
ninety-four bills proposed.107   
Although a push by states for legislation aimed at 
resolving balance billing is a positive move forward, some 
argue that these proposed bills can only go so far due to the 
Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 
1974, a federal law that exempts employer provided 
insurance plans from state regulation.108  In these “self-
insured” plans, employers provide health insurance to their 
employees who then pay claims directly through company 
funding, rather than contracting with an insurance carrier to 
 
103 Felder, supra note 102. 
104 Felder, supra note 102. 
105 Levinson, supra note 18. 
106 Clark, supra note 16; the states that have provided some form of protection 
against balance billing includes California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, 
Maryland and New York that have provided comprehensive protections such as 
for emergency and non-emergency situations and applied to both HMOs and 
PPOs; Arizona, Maine, Minnesota and Oregon passed legislations providing 
consumers with balance billing protection; and New Hampshire and New Jersey 
expanded their pre-existing protections.  Clark, supra note 16. 
107 Clark, supra note 16. 
108 Clark, supra note 16.  
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cover claims as in “fully insured” plans.109  Self-insured 
plans cover about 61% of insured workers across the United 
States.110   
Though beneficial in many respects, current state 
legislation still leaves a large number of Americans 
unprotected.  Looking to alternative dispute resolution 
techniques in resolving other medical care disputes can 
provide insight into how successful these methods would be 
for issues surrounding balance billing.  The problems that 
persist with balance billing regulations could be greatly 
diminished with the enaction of an ADR-based solution.   
 
i. ADR AND HEALTH CARE 
DISPUTES 
Past matters resolved through alternative dispute 
resolution processes provide templates for quick, efficient, 
and fair resolution in lieu of litigation.111  For example, when 
there are claims for reimbursement by a hospital from an 
HMO for dozens of patients, each patient can potentially fit 
into multiple categories of coverage, with varying types of 
claims, degrees of timeliness, and amounts for awards in 
damages.112 
Instead of costly and time-consuming litigation, a 
mediator was able to take less than thirty minutes to sort out 
the varying information for each patient from a spreadsheet, 
from there the HMO and provider were able to resolve all 
claims of the dispute in less than two hours.113  Through 
means of alternative dispute resolution, parties are able to 
concentrate on collaborative mediation.114  Although the 
 
109 Clark, supra note 16. 
110 Clark, supra note 16. 
111 Viggo Boserup, Regulatory Oversight in Health Care, LAW360 (Feb 27, 
2009), https://www.law360.com/articles/89429/regulatory-oversight-in-health-
care. 
112 Boserup, supra note 111. 
113 Boserup, supra note 111. 
114 Boserup, supra note 111. 
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parties still have the option to take reimbursement disputes 
to trial, it is unlikely that a court would utilize such 
spreadsheets in the same way that proved to be advantageous 
in mediation, and a resolution would be significantly 
delayed.115 
Similarly, in a situation where there were fewer 
claims, but still ranged in complex issues, the mediator was 
able to again lay out a spreadsheet, call each party and 
resolve the issues over the phone, all of which happened in 
less than thirty minutes.116  All parties were relieved of the 
time and energy from having to be physically present at a 
mediation.117   
When it comes to arbitration-specific solutions for 
medical disputes, Utah has required pre-dispute arbitration 
agreements for medical malpractice claims.118  Utah’s 
legislators found that the cost of malpractice insurance 
increased due to a growing number of claims and high 
demands of awards, which then increased the cost of health 
care by forcing physicians to practice defensive medicine 
and to subsidize the costs of their increased premiums 
through their patients.119 
While litigation expends time, energy, and money, 
alternative dispute resolution procedures “redirects those 
efforts toward resolution in a more controlled and effective 
process.”120  By such, alternative dispute resolutions can 
allow what already restricted resources currently available 
could go towards addressing other challenges facing the 
healthcare industry as a whole.121  Arbitration would be a 
 
115 Boserup, supra note 111. 
116 Boserup, supra note 111. 
117 Boserup, supra note 111. 
118 James C. Dunkelberger, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Plight of 
Health Care Arbitration Agreements Under Federal law, 2010 B.Y.U.L. REV. 
1869, 1873–75. 
119 Dunkelberger, supra note 118. 
120 Boserup, supra note 111. 
121 Boserup, supra note 111. 
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benefit to the healthcare industry across the United States as 
it would reduce the amount of money being thrust into the 
already exorbitant costs of healthcare for Americans.122  
Although the high price of healthcare will not be solved or 
reduced to the amount of other OECD countries, reducing 
costs from any facet would be advantageous.  The use of 
mediation in other medical disputes was fast, succinct, and 
efficient, which bodes well for the use of ADR to handle 
balance billing issues as well. 
 
i. INDEPENDENT ARBITRATION 
AGREEMENTS BETWEEN 
PROVIDERS AND INSURANCE 
CARRIERS 
As previously discussed, medical procedure prices 
are privately negotiated between the hospitals and insurance 
providers, and making those prices public would arguably 
cut market competition.123  The AHA stresses that health 
providers are concerned that rate-setting legislation will 
create “a plan-determined, nontransparent process that will 
upend private payment negotiation.”124  Both insurance 
carriers and out-of-network providers are advocating for 
autonomy in handling surprise billing.125   
Legislators are pushed and pulled along industry 
and political lines in drafting federal legislation, but what is 
of the utmost importance is that legislators continue to 
protect patients from exorbitant medical costs and ensure 
they remain covered by their insurance plans.126  Arbitration 
can be a beneficial tool for providers who do not deserve to 
 
122 But see Loren Adler et. al, Rep. Ruiz’s Arbitration Proposal for Surprise 
Billing (H.R. 3502) Would Result In Much Higher Costs And Deficits, HEALTH 
AFFAIRS (July 16, 2019), 
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20190716.355260/full/ 
(arguing that it would increase costs through higher premiums). 
123 Felder, supra note 102. 
124 Levinson, supra note 18. 
125 Levinson, supra note 18. 
126 Levinson, supra note 18. 
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carry the burden of diminished reimbursement.127  
Arbitration as a resolution is also pushed for by providers’ 
groups, who advocate for individualized arbitration as a 
means to settle these specific disputes.128  Insurance carriers 
may also stand to benefit from arbitration as they can be 
forced to litigate and defend multiple claims arising out of 
the same occurrence in a variety of venues.129  Using 
arbitration would essentially eliminate this impediment.  
States may have difficulty working proposed 
legislation requiring arbitration around ERISA.130  Within 
ERISA is a broad provision preempting state laws “as they 
may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan,” 
which includes employee-sponsored health insurance 
plans.131  Although states can still enact legislation that 
applies directly to insurances plans or health providers, the 
proposed bills cannot affect employee benefit plans.132  
Therefore, states are preempted from requiring employee 
based insurers to pay for out-of-network surprise billing.133   
However, overall, the introduction of arbitration to 
handle balance billing disputes nation-wide would be 
beneficial to all parties involved; it can act as a great 
advantage for courts burdened by a backlog of cases, as well 
as for the insurance providers and physicians burdened by 





127 Levinson, supra note 18. 
128 Levinson, supra note 18. 
129 Vince Colella, Michigan No-Fault Insurance Reform: A Tragedy Of The 
Commons, LAW360 (Aug. 5, 2019), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1180874/mich-no-fault-insurance-reform-a-
tragedy-of-the-commons. 
130 Levinson, supra note 18. 
131 Levinson, supra note 18; 29 U.S.C.A. § 1144. 
132 Levinson, supra note 18. 
133 Levinson, supra note 18. 
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ii. NEW YORK’S SOLUTIONS TO 
BALANCE BILLING  
Under New York’s Workers’ Compensation Board 
Rules and Regulations § 327.10, arbitration committees 
settle disputes that arise from medical billing.134  These 
committees consist of three appointed physicians, one of 
which must be nominated by the president of the Healthcare 
Association of New York State and one that may be 
nominated by the insurance carrier.135  Though the rule was 
unclear on how the third arbitrator would be selected in this 
process, once nominated, the entire medical bill is arbitrated 
by the hospital’s arbitration committee.136  Whatever items 
of care provided would then be subject to the medical fee 
schedule.137 
Aside from medical billing disputes arising from 
Worker’s Compensation claims, in 2015, New York passed 
a surprise billing law that uses arbitration to settle balance 
billing disputes between health care providers and insurance 
companies; each party submits a proposed amount to the 
arbitrator who then decides the final award.138  
Consequentially, financial analysis from New York’s 
Department of Financial Services found that arbitrators 
decide based on dollar amounts that are above the 80th 
percentile of normal costs, leading to an overall increase in 
cost of medical care in the State.139  Arbitrators apparently 
receive guidance from New York law which suggests they 
consider the 80th percentile of the billed charges, which are 
the charges set by the providers, instead of considering 
“commercially reasonable rates” based on in-network rates 
 
134 N.Y. Workers' Comp. Law § 327.10 (McKinney). 
135 N.Y. Workers' Comp. Law § 327.10 (McKinney). 
136 N.Y. Workers' Comp. Law § 327.10 (McKinney). 
137 N.Y. Workers' Comp. Law § 327.10 (McKinney). 
138 Rachel Bluth, To End Surprise Medical Bills, New York Tried Arbitration. 
Health Care Costs Went U, NPR (Nov. 5, 2019), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2019/11/05/776185873/to-end-
surprise-medical-bills-new-york-tried-arbitration-health-care-costs-went-. 
139 Bluth, supra note 138. 
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charged in that geographic region.140  In response, New York 
senators have sought to develop an alternative bill that would 
still rely on arbitration as a solution, but would instead 
suggest arbiters to consider the commercially reasonable 
rates.141  
Although this bill is not perfect, it has saved New 
Yorker’s more than $400 million in emergency medical 
services since its implementation in early 2015 through 2018 
and has proved successful in ameliorating balance billing 
issues for patient consumers in the state.142  Critics are 
concerned that Washington D.C. does not have the same 
“leadership, compassion, and courage” that was necessary 
for tackling such a complex issue.143  As medical costs 
continue to rise and consumers are being crushed by the debt 
resulting from surprise medical billing,144 Washington 
would stand to benefit by following New York’s example. 
 
i. SENATORS CASSIDY AND 
HASSAN’S PROPOSED 
LEGISLATION 
Senators Bill Cassidy and Maggie Hassan aim to 
introduce legislation that would prevent insured patients 
from receiving surprise medical bills for emergency 
situations.145  Although patients receive insurance through 
government aid, and the Knox–Keene Act provides 
protections for HMO member patients,146 not all who are 
covered by other insurance systems are protected from 
 
140 Bluth, supra note 138. 
141 Bluth, supra note 138. 
142 Linda A. Lacewell, Winning the Fight Against Surprise Medical Bills, NEW 
YORK DAILY NEWS (Oct. 1, 2019), https://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/ny-
oped-winning-the-fight-against-surprise-medical-bills-20191001-
aoyalydhmncmjhn23tpyujmrxm-story.html. 
143 Lacewell, supra note 142. 
144 Lacewell, supra note 142. 
145 McIntire, supra note 98. 
146 DEPARTMENT OF MANAGED HEALTH CARE, supra note 35. 
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receiving bills after emergency medical services.147  This bill 
would protect non-HMO insured patients from receiving 
surprise billing for “emergency services, non-emergency 
services following emergency care at an out-of-network 
[facility] when the patient cannot be transported to an in-
network facility and care provided by an out-of-network 
provider at an in-network facility.”148 
The bipartisan senators’ legislation would require 
insurance providers to automatically pay the difference 
between a patient’s in-network cost sharing and the median 
in-network rate for smaller claims, allowing providers or 
carriers the option to appeal the payment through arbitration 
for certain larger claims.149  In that arbitration, both parties 
would be able to propose their best offers, the arbitrator 
would then make a decision, choosing one of the two offers 
based on their analysis of the “commercially reasonable rates 
in that geographic area.”150   
This proposed legislation has been compared to 
California A.B. 72, which despite leaving gaps in patient 
protection for out-of-network emergency services, has still 
successfully reduced the number of surprise billings for 
patient consumers. 151  However, while beneficial for 
consumers, California physicians claim A.B. 72 has lowered 
their pay.152  Sen. Hassan and Cassidy’s bill pushes for a 
lower dollar threshold required to enter into arbitrations, a 
solution beneficial to healthcare providers, most likely 
because it will allow them to negotiate for higher 
compensation for a greater number of claims.153 
 
147 McIntire, supra note 98. 
148 McIntire, supra note 98. 
149 Margot Sanger-Katz, Bans on Surprise Medical Bills May Pass After All, 
THE UPSHOT (Dec. 8, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/08/upshot/deal-surprise-medical-bills.html. 
150 McIntire, supra note 98. 
151 Sanger-Katz, supra note 149. 
152 Sanger-Katz, supra note 149. 
153 Sanger-Katz, supra note 149. 
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This proposed bill is also similar to New York’s 
current surprise billing law in that an arbitrator will decide 
between each parties’ proposed offer, but differs by 
considering the reasonable geographic rates, rather than the 
average amount of billed charges, which has led New York 
arbitrators to consistently decide on amounts above the 
normal costs of care.154  While this legislation would use an 
alternative method for arbitrators to determine what 
constitutes reasonable rates, it still may be unappealing to 
insurance carriers.155  Due to physicians regularly charging 
higher out-of-network rates to compensate for their overall 
loss in reimbursement, the “reasonable” rates within 
geographic regions would be increased as well.156 
While bipartisan support for the bill substantially 
increases its likelihood of being enacted,157 White House 
administration officials have stated they were not in favor of 
arbitration as a means of settling balance billing disputes.158  
Although this comes as a concern, Senator Cassidy, who too 
was skeptical about using arbitration over other ADR 
methods, feels that his proposal is the “sweet spot,” only 
using arbitration as a second step when insurance and health 
providers could not reach an agreement.159   
While this legislation has its fair share of critiques 
by both physicians, insurance carriers, and the White House, 
both California and New York’s balance billing laws have 
shown to be successful in reducing out-of-network care debt 
for patients, and there is a potential for legislation like Sen. 
Cassidy and Hassan’s bill to improve balance billing 
nationwide.   
 
 
154 Bluth, supra note 138. 
155 Levinson, supra note 18. 
156 Ass'n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. Brown, supra note 57. 
157 Sanger-Katz, supra note 149. 
158 McIntire, supra note 98. 
159 McIntire, supra note 98. 
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V. THE ALEXANDER–MURRAY 
OPTION 
Another solution called the “Alexander–Murray” 
option is a bill targeting various areas of concern in the 
health care sector, including public health, health education, 
prescription drugs, transparency, and surprise billing.160  
Similar to Senators Cassidy and Hassan’s proposed 
legislation, advocates of this bill suggest paying out-of-
network providers through a “median in-network rate,”161 
that would require setting a rate based on what other doctors 
in the same area are paid for the same procedure, or using a 
database of local charges to calculate what the median in-
network price would be.162  
The Alexander–Murray option has been entered 
before the Senate and is widely debated, but currently there 
is no sign that the bill will be brought to an agreement or 
resolution.163  This proposal provides three options to protect 
patients against balance billing,164 essentially combining 
aspects of California’s A.B. 72, Senators Cassidy and 
Hassan’s Proposal, and New York’s surprise billing law.165  
The first would require any in-network facility to guarantee 
that all individual providers are considered in-network for 
health plans and their patients (A.B. 72).166  The second 
option would allow any surprise bill over $750 to be 
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arbitrated between the payer and the provider by each giving 
their best offer and allowing an independent judge to decide 
(Senators Cassidy and Hassan’s bill).167  And finally, the 
third option would require the insurance provider to pay the 
physician or facility at the median rate in the specified 
geographic region (NY surprise billing law).168 
There is concern that the Alexander–Murray option 
will upset health provider groups because physicians still run 
the risk of receiving reduced compensation from insurance 
carriers.169  But, supporters of the proposal guarantee they 
will step in if insurance carriers decline hospitals’ and 
physicians’ adequate payment.170  
 In order to continue both health providers and 
insurance carriers’ desire to keep the costs ambiguous while 
maintaining an arbitration provision, the Alexander–Murray 
option has the potential to solve a myriad of issues caused 
by balance billing.  By having a lower minimum dollar 
amount to enter into arbitration, more disputes can be 
resolved without the unnecessary costs and disadvantages of 
litigation.  Using median rates of care in balance billing 
arbitrations provides parties with room to negotiate costs, 
while satisfying the AHA’s desire to restrict standardized 
and transparent rates for medical services.171  The 
Alexander–Murray option provides more expansive options 
for handling balance billing disputes, while retaining 
arbitration as a fundamental solution.172  
 
VI. CONCLUSION  
Surprise medical billing disputes present a grave 
problem that only adds to the already exorbitant prices of 
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medical care in the United States.173  It places a burden on 
all sectors of the industry, from consumers, to physicians, 
and the insurance providers involved.  With so many 
affected by surprise emergency billing, there is a wide range 
of complex litigation that follows.174  Ultimately, an 
arbitration-inclusive solution is imperative to protecting 
health providers against balance billing, while maintaining 
protections for health consumers.   
The proposed legislation discussed in Part IV offers 
some aspect of arbitration to solve balance billing disputes 
between insurance carriers and hospitals or physicians, even 
if only as a “second” option.175  The inclusion of arbitration 
clauses is essential in combating balance billing issues by 
eliminating many of the disadvantages that come with 
litigation.  Excessive time, costs, and obstacles that arise in 
litigation because of the intricacies of the American 
healthcare system — as illustrated in Part III—can be 
avoided through arbitration.176  Though some members of 
Congress may be wary of using arbitration in balance billing 
disputes, there is a great possibility that between the various 
options being brought before the House, arbitration clauses 
will be incorporated into legislation that will hopefully pass 
in the near future.177  
While Sens. Cassidy and Hassan’s proposed 
legislation may currently have the greatest likelihood to be 
enacted because of its bi-partisan support, the Alexander–
Murray option would be the most promising bill to protect 
the interest of all parties.178  The bill combines aspects of 
current successful balance billing laws in California and 
New York, and contains features proposed by Sens. Cassidy 
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and Hassan’s legislation, providing the most expansive 
options for settling by requiring that all independent 
physicians be considered in-network while at in-network 
facilities, mandating that insurance carriers pay physicians 
the standard geographic rate, and using a low-threshold 
arbitration option in which deliberation is based on the 
median in-network rates.179  If enacted, this option has the 
potential to make a big impact on the United States’ balance 
billing issue.  The bill would allow for a nation-wide 
industry standard in handling these disputes, taking the guess 
work out for states searching for comprehensive regulations.  
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